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THE RISE OF THE PAN
Guy Poitras*

I.

INTRODUCTION

N the year 2000, while much of the world was anxiously anticipating
the new century, Mexico was passing a significant and remarkable
milestone. For almost a decade Mexico had experienced a neoliberal
transformation in economic policy. Privatization, de-regulation, fiscal restraint, market access, regional integration, and other structural adjustments had gone a long way toward making Mexico one of the most
market-oriented large economies in the world. At first these economic
reforms overshadowed political reforms. If the current Mexican elites,
especially those in the government party, had any hopes that such economic changes would inoculate them against political competition, they
were wrong. In 2000 the government party lost its monopoly of power.
For the first time since the Mexican revolution (1910-1917) another political party, one founded in opposition to the revolution itself, came to
power. By winning the presidency, Mexico ended the longest continuous
rule of a party in any country in the world.
The defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2000 was
not entirely unexpected. When the National Action Party (Partidode Accion Nacional, hereinafter PAN) won a plurality of votes for the presidency in the national election of 2000, the PRI's hegemony over Mexican
politics officially came to an end years after President Carlos Salinas had
declared it to be over. After more than seventy years of one-party dominance Mexico acquired a competitive party system and a more democratic and open political system. Mexican democracy, which has been
long questioned as thinly veiled authoritarianism, was given the credibility it lacked for so long.
Of all the questions that are raised by this monumental change in Mexican politics two rather simple ones are addressed here. First, was the rise
of the PAN as impressive a triumph for the political party as it appeared
to be? And second, why did it happen? In this early attempt to answer
these two questions there is much we still do not know. What is clear
even now is that the rise of the PAN, as symbolized by its first sexenio of
the Mexican presidency, is not just about the political party or its leaders
but, about the fundamental changes in Mexico and in Mexican politics.
In other words, while the PAN had a hand in its emergence as the central
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political player in the new Mexican party system it also benefited from
changes and developments in Mexico that provided an opportunity that
PAN was able to seize.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The PAN is no newcomer to Mexican politics. Unlike the myriad of
minor parties that emerged during the democratic opening of the 1990s or
the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partidode Revolucion Democratica
or PRD), the PAN has a relatively long pedigree. Established in 1939 by
Manuel Gomez Morin and some middle class businessmen and lawyers,
the party never presented the dominant party with a serious electoral
challenge for much of its history. In fact, the PAN's mere existence probably gave the PRI and the government a veneer of legitimacy. After all
the rhetoric of the Mexican revolution was a powerful symbol for the
party. Isolated and small the original PAN provided the government with
a weak opposition out of sync with popular opinion. PAN's early, principled opposition to the Mexican revolution served its purpose for the revolutionary elite who managed the system from above. The PAN also
sided with the religious (pro-clerical) elements of the country against the
secular power of the emerging political system of the 1930s and 1940s.
While Mexicans are overwhelmingly Catholic, many resent the secular
power of the clergy before as well as after the revolution. The PAN was
also swimming upstream earlier in the twentieth century on another issue.
The Mexican government under the revolutionary leaders of the PRI
opted for a mixed economy with private and public ownership and regulation. This static approach to import substitution industrialization was
clearly at odds with some PANista preferences for free markets and weak
government. The early PAN position within the one-party system was
that of a principled dissenter settled on the margins of the Mexican political mainstream.
The principles the PAN held dear were not always cherished in official
Mexican circles. Among the most venerable principles of the party are
nationalism, human dignity, the common good, democracy, and the importance of the community or group.' To some extent, these represent
the era of national unity and independence in the post-revolutionary life
of the country that many Mexicans more or less accepted long after the
revolution ended. Business elites and religious conservatives who formed
the bedrock of early political support for the PAN would later broaden
and deepen their commitments to related principles. Early on the PAN
rejected the corporate system of governmental control over civil society
that was institutionalized under Cardenas in the 1930s. The PAN also
rejected the populist system of mass mobilization found in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil during the 1930s and 1940s. Finally, it rejected the
1. Partido Acci6n Nactional, at http://www.pan.org.mx (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
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state capitalism practiced off and on by the PRI-controlled government
until the 1980s.
Later in the twentieth century the PAN remained true to its ideological
identity and began to expand its principles to reflect liberal democracy in
the tradition of John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. Property
rights, religious freedom, and free trade were incorporated into the
PAN's pantheon of basic principles. Somewhat later, as Mexico began to
undergo change and self-doubt it protested corruption and lack of political freedoms and human rights. The "Republican Party of Mexico" survived at the margins of Mexico's political system for more than a half
century.
Principles and platforms are one thing, but electoral success is quite
another. Led by traditional purists for many decades, the PAN posed no
serious challenge to its dominant adversary at the ballot box. It was
never able to garner many votes during the heyday of the PRI. By the
1960s PAN was able to achieve double-digit support at the polls for the
presidency, but its strengths remained concentrated at local and regional
levels. Its first state gubernatorial triumphs did not come until the more
open reform period in the late twentieth century. Until the PRI broke
into two rival factions in the late 1980s, PANista hopes for electoral victories mostly rested on a rather small segment of the voting populace.
PANistas are typically educated, wealthy, and urban. They are also concentrated in the north, where PRI is less strong.
III.

THE RISE

In the turbulent period of 1988-2000 the PAN went from being an alsoran for the largest prize to the winner of the largest prize. In 1988, the
PAN placed third for the presidency behind the PRI and a coalition of
left parties (then called the Democratic Current), however, the election
results were widely questioned. Indeed, the PRI probably lost the election outright to the candidate on the left or at best did not win by the
margin it claimed. The PRI won 50.7 percent of the vote. 2 Twelve years
later things could not have been more different. Not only was the 2000
presidential election fair, but the PAN won the election with 42.5 percent
of the vote, which beat out the PRI (with 36.1 percent) and the PRD
3
(with 16.6 percent).
How much of this change of political fortunes is linked to the PAN
prospering as a political party and how much of it is due to other factors?
This is not a question that can be answered completely at this point. Still,
one can and should distinguish between relative and absolute rises (or
gains) to help us understand this remarkable turnaround. The rise of the
PAN is first based on its electoral success compared to that of its adversaries. It became more competitive against the other parties and more pop2. Instituto Federal Electoral, at http://www.ife.org.mx (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
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ular among the voting public in Mexico. The absolute rise of the PAN is
based on the increasing numbers of popular votes in local and state elections once dominated by others.
The PAN has become enormously successful. In comparative terms the
PAN went from last to first among the major parties in the span of three
national elections. From 1988 to 2000 popular votes for the PAN in Congress more than doubled - increasing by 118 percent. Similarly, popular
votes for the PAN candidate for the president increased sixty-eight percent from 1994 to 2000.
The other side of this perspective is the decline of the PRI. PAN's rise
must be seen within the context of the emergence of a multiparty system.
While the PAN posted strong relative gains during the 1988 to 2000 period, the leading party went in the other direction. The PRI declined 25.6
percent in its share of popular votes from 1988 to 2000 in Congress and
4
about the same (twenty-five percent) from 1994 to 2000 for President.
The balance of popular support was changing throughout the 1990s but it
was not until 2000 that the PAN moved ahead of the PRI and the PRD in
relative strength for both the presidential and legislative elections. Given
the choices available, Mexican voters shifted allegiances from the two
other parties and became more independent and willing to consider more
than one party seriously. Neither the PRI nor the PRD were able to hold
their relative strength for president or for the national legislature for the
entire twelve-year period. The reversal of fortunes was seismic.
However, the PAN was able to do more than switch places with its
opponents. It was able to increase the overall number of voters as well.
The absolute rise in electoral support for the PAN indicates that it is not
just a matter of declining enthusiasm for its opponents, but also a matter
of the PAN being able to increase its electoral attractiveness by getting
new voters into the fold, doing better throughout the country than it had
in the.past, and taking advantage of ticket splitting and weakening party
identification.
This led to some changes in voting behavior. Although it is doubtful
that many PRD voters voted for the PAN enough did, which boosted the
PAN's vote totals for president. Some PRD voters voted for PRD candidates in Congress but then vote for Fox.5 Some PRI voters may have
done the same thing. The positive side of this voting behavior is that the
PAN, under the leadership of Vicente Fox Quesada, increased the absolute number of its votes at the voting booths (casillas) with increasingly
clean and fair elections monitored by the independent Federal Electoral
Institute (IFE). The PAN won 15.9 million votes for president in 2000 out
of 37.6 million total votes cast compared to 9.2 million PAN votes for
president in 1994 with 35.6 million total votes. In the Senate PAN won
about 2 million more votes in 2000 than it did in 1994 with 16.2 million in
2000 and 14.3 million in 1994.
4. Instituto Federal Electoral, supra note 2.
5. LEVY & BRUHN, supra note 3.

2003]

THE RISE OF THE PAN

The shifting strengths within the Mexican Congress are somewhat more
complicated. Party representation and alliances in a system with both
single member district and proportional representation in both the upper
and lower house affected the PAN's overall position. In the House of
Deputies, the lower house, the term of office is two years. 300 of the 500
seats are selected from single member districts, and 200 are selected by
proportional representation. It is here that the Alianza por el Cambio (a
coalition of the PAN and PVEM, or the ecologist party) grabbed 44.8
percent of the 500 seats compared to 41.6 percent for the PRI. Another
coalition, this time on the left, was unable to make significant gains. The
Alianza por Mexico garnered 13.6 percent of the seats. In the Senate,
with four senators for each state and the Federal District, the PRI outpolled the opposition by winning 45.3 percent of the seats; the PAN-led alliance got 41.4 percent and the PRD-led alliance got 13.3 percent. 6
This is a slight change from the 1997 mid-term elections in which the
PRI led the pack in the House of Deputies with 238 of 500 seats. The
PAN did not achieve a ruling majority in either house; in the 2003 midterm elections, things got worse. The PAN lost its plurality in the House
of Deputies to the PRI. This leaves Mexican national politics in a competitive stance. Since 1997 no party has controlled the presidency and both
branches of the legislature. Further, since 2000 the PAN stepped onto the
center stage of Mexican national politics for the first time with the presidency but without a governing majority in the legislature.
IV.

EXPLAINING THE ASCENDANCY

Why did the PAN win the presidency in 2000? The PAN's success is
indicative of important changes in elections, party politics, and Mexico
itself. Speculation about the rising fortunes of a once minor, right-wing
party suggests that any future answers should focus on several dynamics
in Mexican politics at the turn of the century.
In the glow of the 2000 triumph, the temptation is to stress the role that
the PAN played in its own ascendancy. There is certainly something to be
said for this emphasis on intra-party renovation, but the evolution of the
PAN must also be placed in a broader context. The PAN did not come to
power in a vacuum. Rather, Mexico and its political system began to
emerge as a more open and less corporatist enterprise. An opportunist
interpretation of the PAN focuses on its ability to adjust to a changing
dynamic.
The PAN is not quite the same party that it was in the 1980s. The party
of Manuel Clouthier (who ran in 1988 as the party's presidential candidate) and Diego Fernandez (who ran in 1994) came in third behind the
PRI and the PRD. In those two years the PAN only did slightly better in
Congress. The PAN placed a distant third behind the PRD in congres6. Calculated from Instituto Federal Electoral, supra note 2; see also LEVY &
BRUHN, supra note 3, at 100.
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sional seats in 1988 but surged into second place ahead of the PRD in
1994. While retaining its essential identity and electoral base, the PAN
made adjustments that proved to be very wise.
The most visible change was in the leadership of the PAN. The selection process for PANista candidates became more open, allowing candidates to compete for nominations in a way that no Mexican party had
done before. This put pressure on other parties to do the same. Perhaps
due in part to this, PAN's presidential candidate Vicente Fox Quesada,
who was inspired by Clouthier to get into electoral politics, was stamped
out of a different mold than previous PANistas. A more outgoing and
charismatic candidate, Fox adopted a more American-style approach to
public image and campaign. This flamboyance and personalism stood in
stark contrast to the more subdued and conservative style of previous
PANistas. The Fox campaign also downplayed PAN's roots and narrow
partisan base and sought to appeal to a broader electorate. More populist and less partisan, Fox was not your traditional PANista candidate. In
fact, he asked his strategist to "sell" him in the campaign as if he were any
other product. 7 This "selling of the president" quite strongly evokes the
image of U.S. campaigns. As a result, the PAN campaign became less
elitist and unified as it became more appealing and attractive. Standing
on principle became less compelling to the PAN, at least under Fox, than
winning. In this sense, the triumph at the polls in 2000 can be attributed
to the candidate as much as it can be to the PAN as a traditional player.
Along with these came changes in electoral strategy. The PAN had
been a party of the north for many years - strong in some states and some
municipios but certainly not nation-wide. But given the chance the PAN
took advantage of incremental electoral reforms in the 1990s and of the
independent supervision of elections by the Federal Electoral Institute to
seek a more national and dynamic electoral strategy. Due to its own role
in negotiating a new pact on electoral reform, the PAN could and did
field more attractive candidates at local, state, and national levels. While
the PRI could still tap the coffers of the government to fund its campaigns, a more level playing field made it possible to popularize and extend the PAN campaign strategy. The increasing competitiveness of
elections also helped the PRD, another opposition party, but it had a
negative impact on the PRI which was the ruling party.
The ideology of the PAN may have helped as well. The party did not
stress its ideology or platform because, in many ways, it had already won
on these issues. Political discrimination against the church and the clergy
ended almost a decade earlier under the opposition party. A more open
political system with a more level playing field had been an important
part of the agenda for Mexico throughout much of the 1990s. Also, the
PAN's free-market capitalism had been adopted, at least in most respects,
by the PRI if not by the PRD. Political discourse in Mexico had shifted in
7. Sam Dillon, The 'Sell Me' Politician the Mexicans Bought, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2000

at A6.
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the PAN's direction before the 2000 election. With this shift the political
spectrum had also shifted to the right. This left the neoliberal leaders of
the PRI in a position of saying "me too". The PAN had become legitimate and even important to Mexico in a way it never had before. The
PRI's efforts to expropriate the PAN's neoliberal ideology of free markets and property rights did not stem the rise of the PAN but only confirmed the PAN's rise as the new empowered player.
The PAN can obviously take some credit for what it accomplished in
2000. Looking to the PAN to better understand its rise to power assumes
that the PAN was the architect, perhaps even the sole architect, of its
triumph in 2000. This may overstate the case. While the PAN clearly did
what it had to do to become a major player in the emerging multi-party
system, a number of important facilitating factors in Mexican politics at
the time considerably helped the PAN to its ascendancy. In this sense,
the PAN can be viewed as both an independent variable and a dependent
variable in the changes leading to the 2000 earthquake in Mexican
politics.
Several arguments or hypotheses can be advanced that the PAN was in
the right place at the right time. In other words, Mexican voters were
ready for a change as called for in the PAN's campaign. Changes in Mexican civil society, the implosion of the PRI, the dealignment of parties,
the shifting voting patterns, as well as the changing political culture, had
an impact on the PAN's fortunes. In some cases these were a long time in
coming, but they were indispensable to setting the parameters of the
PAN's rise.
The first argument is that Mexico had changed more than its politics.
In this argument the PRI is portrayed as an atrophied party that changed
a lot less than the country it ruled. Socio-economic changes such as urbanization, education, industrialization, and structural adjustments made
the PRI corporatist and semi-authoritarian rule less relevant to Mexican
society in the waning years of the twentieth century. Mexico was not the
same country in the 1990s that it was in the 1930s when the corporatist
model was established. The PRI was out of step with the most dynamic
elements of the Mexican society and economy.
The changing Mexico argument has a corollary. Not only did the
broader changes erode the rationale for the old system but the old system
proved to be self-liquidating. The static policies during much of the PRI's
rule contributed to social and economic changes that made it harder to
sustain the PRI rule. At the same time, this permitted the PAN, other
parties, and civil society in general to become more independent and
more insistent on a place at the table. In fact, it could be argued that the
growth of civil society and its pressures on government were even more
important than electoral reform. 8 As political change began to make
8.
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elections a contest for power rather than a corporatist device for regime
legitimation, a trend toward vote maximization reflected the more competitive openness of Mexico's society and economy. Mexican voters had
a choice within the neoliberal camp between the PAN and the PRI. A
vote for the PAN was often against the PRI and its tarnished reputation.
Another hypothesis or argument about the PAN as a dependent variable in its own rise to power is the implosion of the PRI. Essentially, this
argument is that the PRI was its own worst enemy. What the PRI did or
did not do was instrumental in the rise of the PAN. During its long tenure as ruling party in Mexico, the PRI was essentially a patronage party
to mobilize support to keep the leadership in power. It was not prepared
to compete on a level playing field because for many years it did not have
to. Its purpose was to mobilize support, legitimize its rule, and control
civil society. Since the PRI or its minions counted the votes for many
years, the PRI would only lose if this could not be helped or if "winning"
would carry a high cost. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the presidential vote for the PRI reached astronomical heights and fictional levels.
Elections had a number of functions under the PRI, but deciding who
won the election was not often one of them.
1988 marked the beginning of the end of the PRI's impunity. The debacle of the 1988 presidential election unleashed changes in the election
process that the PRI, while it could not entirely control, had no choice
but to participate. The momentum from below continued to build for
reform throughout the following decade, although the reform only very
gradually kept going at a pace the PRI would allow. Eventually, these
delaying tactics ran out and the election codes of Mexico began to take
on the reality and the appearance of a state with genuine democratic
leanings.
The PRI also continued to be its own worst enemy away from the voting booth. In 1994, after Salinas stepped down, was the first time that the
government and its party were exposed as being severely corrupt and perhaps even worse. Assassinations of government officials, including the
Attorney General and of PRI candidate Colosio, led many to suspect that
the PRI and the government were irredeemable as a positive force in
Mexico. Drug cartel links to high government officials or relatives further
scandalized the government. There were other calamities as well: the
Zapatista revolt in Chiapas on January 1, 1994, the mishandling or
delayed handling of the peso devaluation in late 1994, the criminal activity of Carlos Salinas's brother, the decline in real wages for many workers
and the middle class in the mid-1990s liquidity crisis, and the growing
sense of outrage among many over the sacrifices the people made in the
face of politics as usual. The PRI seemed more out of touch with Mexico
than it ever had been.
There is also the dealignment argument. In the 1990s, the party system
began to change in important ways for the first time since the PRI was
created under Plutarco Calles in the late 1920s. For Mexico dealignment
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meant the death knell for the one-party system. The party system, with
the PRI at the center and all others on the far periphery, splintered badly.
In this sense, what happened in 2000 was a continuation of what began in
the 1980s.
Dealignment came with greater competition. Except perhaps for the
PRD, the other major parties have parity for many races at different
levels in the country. Each retains its historic stronghold. Yet each is
seeking to build upon or mitigate the damage from the new opportunities
in electoral politics. In other words, the democratic transition, long
delayed by the PRI intransigence, has now moved on to democratic consolidation. In this sense, democratic consolidation in Mexico began to
resemble what Costa Rica, Chile, and other countries had experienced.
Two of the parties competed in most regions (PAN vs. PRI or PRI vs.
PRD). In 2000 PAN carried eighteen states for the presidency; the PRI
carried twelve; and the PRD carried one. Shifting and declining party
identification has affected the PAN, its opponents, and the party system
itself. A related hypothesis deals with election integrity and dealignment.
Dealignment was possible with a more level playing field supervised by
an independent electoral commission or court coupled with clean and fair
elections. Less than half of all Mexican voters have a fixed party
identity. 9
The final argument is about changing political culture. Although slow
to change, political culture, or the body of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions
that people have about politics, is hardly immutable, even in a semi-authoritarian system like Mexico's. In the 1990s political culture may have
become a factor working against the old system and its principal leaders.
Mexican political culture has become noticeably less passive and more
assertive. The blows to the body politic in the 1990s may have taken their
toll on a more subject-oriented culture detected in Mexico some forty
years ago. While too fine a point should not be made on the argument,
there does seem to be a more general willingness for different social
groups and classes to protest or complain about everything of concern to
them, which ranges from crime rates to the location for a new airport for
Mexico City. The PRI in power probably could not easily convince many
that the party was blameless for the increasing restiveness of a more
aware and less patient populace that had suffered from political and economic strains for many years.
V.

THE PAN IN POWER

What can we expect from this shift in political fortunes? However difficult the transition for the PAN and for Mexico in the last decade of the
twentieth century what lies ahead could be just as challenging.
Mexican party politics are likely to move forward after 2000. Just as
important, continuities can be found before and after the Mexican revolu9.
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tion. This more recent sea change in Mexican politics will not erode all
the features of Mexican politics or society. An election can usually have
only a modicum of impact, lasting or not, on the behavior and prospects
for an emerging democratic system in Mexico. For example, freer elections in a more pluralistic political system are no cure for corruption, but
corruption itself may change and be exposed more effectively in such a
system. A PAN government cannot expect to avoid criticism about corruption in its own house. Likewise, a system of "divided government" in
Mexico, where one party holds the presidency but no party has a voting
majority in one or both houses of the Congress, suggests that there are
important challenges that lie ahead for inventing a process that helps to
govern the country effectively.
After years on the political fringe the PAN is currently at the center of
Mexico's political universe. But shifting from the opposition to the ruling
party is not that easy, just as the PRI is finding it hard to be an opposition
party with some degree of unity. No longer can the PAN select the issues
with which it wishes to challenge or bash an aging party. Now, it must set
an agenda for governance and take on risks as well as opportunities that
were clearly beyond its prowess in the old system. The real challenge of
the rise of the PAN will come as it attempts to govern in a "weak state"
with multiple parties and independent institutions vying for influence.
Can the PAN hold onto its gains or will the PRI make a comeback?
Something is happening in Mexico to suggest that changes in executivelegislative relations, inter-party competition, and even federal-state relations may make it difficult for any party to become dominant in the future. There is no going back. While the PRI may hope to alternate in
power with the PAN or with other parties in the years to come, no party,
including the PAN, can expect to resuscitate one-party rule. That genie
cannot be put back in the bottle, which may be just as well.
In the era of post-hegemonic power, the world of politics and parties
cannot guarantee the PAN or any party a secure, predictable future. Victories and defeats lie ahead. For example, already Fox has won some
battles with the oil workers union, but he has not been able to get foreign
investment into some facets of the oil exploration business. His tax policies, immigration plan, and pro-business policies have opened him up to
stiff criticism from the rural poor and from a politically divided yet independent legislature. 10 At the same time, the PRI struggles to find a role
in the new party system. It controls two-thirds of the governorships and
has more seats in the national legislature than any other party. Its heyday
may be over for now, but a political future without a major role for the
PRI seems unlikely at best.
The transition to political competition in Mexico does have its downside. As Winston Churchill once said, "In a war you can only be killed
10. Ginger Thompson, Mexico's Leader is Finding the Democratic Road Bumpy, N.Y.
TiMES, May 10, 2001, at A3.
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once, but in politics many times."' "I Unlike the old days under the PRI,
the PAN and any other party in twenty-first century Mexico should be
prepared for that looming eventuality.
The PAN under Fox did something, perhaps unintentionally, that is
very important for Mexico. In 2000 it ended the national myth that only
one party was synonymous with the government, the Revolution, and
even the country itself. Today Mexican voters have helped push Mexico
beyond this central myth of post-revolutionary politics to consider the
possibility that there is room for contention and competition. Bounded
competitiveness could be good for Mexico and does not suggest the end
of order and stability that was so prized in the PRI years. The PAN, in its
drive to power, has perhaps unintentionally showed Mexicans something
that is important to everyone - whether the PAN is their party or not.
Mexico under PAN leadership could be far more trying than anything
the PRI had to face during its long tenure. If it has any hopes of doing
more than going down in history as ending PRI hegemony in Mexico, the
PAN, and the other parties as well, has its work cut out for it. Although
Mexicans do not live in a totally different country as a result of the 2000
election, they do live in a Mexico in which power is shared more readily.
Whatever the future of the PAN its triumph in 2000 may have more far
reaching consequences for Mexico than the closing of one era and the
opening of another.

11. Famous Quotes, at http://www.brainyquote.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2003).
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